Russian-Cuban Relations since 1992: Continuing Camaraderie in a Post-Soviet World

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Granma International, 27 May , 3. Gorbachev talks about Bush attempting to influence him regarding SovietCuban relations on a number of occasion in his memoirs. Gorbachev, Zhizn i Reformy Kniga 2, — Granma, 31 December , 1. Katushev had close ties to the Cuban ruling elite and on leaving his post as Soviet ambassador to Cuba in November Castro had awarded him the Order of Solidarity for his work on the island. Granma, 23 November , 1. Bain, Soviet-Cuban Relations to Granma, 29 August , 1. This was very different from the very concise report at the start of the coup that had simply stated that Gennadii Yanaev had replaced Gorbachev as President of the Soviet Union due to ill-health.

Granma, 19 August , 1. Boris Pankin believed that Baker had been able to bring pressure to bear on Gorbachev over this decision and that relations with the U. Tauris Publishers, , However, the implosion of the Soviet Union, which simultaneously ended SovietCuban relations, meant that many of these pressures simply vanished. Chief amongst these was Marxist-Leninism which had been of the utmost importance in the relationship. Moreover, its removal from the internal policies pursued by the Kremlin would also impact on Russian-Cuban relations, but the result was that the disappearance of Marxist-Leninism was a key factor in the massive downturn in relations between Moscow and Havana in the period from to This downturn was so swift and dramatic that by the end of it would have appeared to the casual observer as if the thirty-year relationship between Moscow and Havana had never existed as many aspects of the relationship had been destroyed, with the removal of Marxist-Leninism being fundamental to this.

This was illustrated on 7 September when Fidel Castro announced that the joint project to build the nuclear power plant at Juragua had been mothballed. In addition, the prominent Cuban-Americans Carlos Alberto Montaner and Carlos Fanqui visited the Russian capital in May for a conference held on Cuba which debated what would happen to the island with the end of SovietCuban relations. It was highly critical of the Caribbean island and its government with A. In October , in a further attempt to hasten the demise of the Castro regime in light of the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the Cuban Democracy Act, or Torricelli Bill, which further tightened the U.

A resolution condemning it was placed before the UN in November , and in the ensuing vote the Russian Federation abstained. This was truly historic, as Moscow had never voted in this manner before, but it was repeated in and The deterioration in relations was not just political but also economic.

In delivery problems of Soviet goods to the Caribbean may have been blamed for the sudden drop in trade levels, but they fell still further in , when it crashed to a mere million pesos, a figure less than 25 percent of the level, or below 9 percent of trade conducted in This dramatic fall in trade continued in and but is even more graphically illustrated if a comparison to or the first five-year plan between the Soviet Union and Cuba is made. If has a base figure of , has a figure of , a figure of 71 and only has a figure of In the late s, even as the terms of trade had begun to turn against Cuba, this figure had exceeded or even , but in , twenty-nine years after the first five-year agreement, trade was less that half of the level.

Figure 3. Cuban imports of Russian goods were falling even more quickly than overall trade between the two countries. In Russian imports made up only 23 percent of total trade and in this fell to just 13 percent. Although this did not happen it did lead to the balsero crisis of August when over 25, Cubans had fled the island. This meant that one of the Figure 3. Not only was Yeltsin and their ideas most certainly not based on Marxist-Leninism, but they also believed that it was not possible for Moscow in the early s to have close relations with both Havana and Washington and due to both the importance that the Russian government attached to relations with the U.

This had a number of knock-on effects for Russian-Cuban relations. A number of the new Russian companies that appeared at this time who were no longer constrained by political motives simply did not wish to trade with Cuba in the traditional manner but instead wished to implement new terms of trade which the Caribbean island simply could not afford. The Russian desire for Cuba to pay for its experts working on the Juragua project in hard currency was a perfect example of this.

Moreover, as the Russian economy was thrown into turmoil by the harsh policies implemented by the Kremlin, who wished to move to the market economy as quickly as possible, more established Russian companies at this time were in no position to compete with their Western counterparts in an increasingly competitive Cuban market. This was the logical conclusion of neoliberal economics as it is simply the most efficient and competitive companies that thrive in such a model.

As stated, Russian exports to Cuba falling at a faster rate than imports from Cuba to Russia graphically illustrated this point. Ermakov, head of the Department on Cuba in the Russian Latin American Department, stated in an interview in February that ideology no longer played any part in relations between Havana and Moscow. Granma did print a number of articles on the unfolding situation in the former Soviet Union with many concentrating on the socio-economic problems that faced the vast proportion of the population.

A number of Cuban academic articles at this time also commented upon this, as did Castro who on a number of occasions also highlighted the socio-political problems that engulfed Russia in the s. This will be examined in more depth in chapter 5 but Cuba was of the opinion that the U. However, it appears that the real intended audience was not an international one but instead an internal Cuban one.

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Traditionally the U. Castro was attempting to use this speech to shift the blame for this away from himself and his government to once again external reasons beyond their control. However, what was absolutely crucial was that even in exchanges of Cuban sugar for Russian oil were mooted. As detailed, trade may have been a fraction of earlier levels, but in these very difficult days for the Castro regime with the very survival of the revolution in question, any trade was of great importance for the Caribbean island, but trade with Russia was particularly significant as at this time it was one of the few sources of much needed oil.

Simply, the government in Havana did not wish to jeopardise the exchanges that were taking place by being overly critical of Russia. It appeared as if realist pragmatism, prevalent throughout the revolutionary period, was still very much in evidence in the decision-making apparatus of the Cuban government. Precisely for this reason, the external vulnerability of the economy was not eliminated by a prolonged insertion in these relations. However, Russian-Cuban relations did still continue and, although much reduced in comparison to the Soviet era, they remained vital to the Cuban Revolution at this time.

Therefore, criticism of Russia and Russia-Cuban relations was avoided in fear of jeopardizing them, with realist pragmatism still being very much in evidence on the island. This downturn was both political and economic with the Cuban economy suffering greatly from the loss of its most important trading partner. The result was that the disappearance of Marxist-Leninism from relations between Moscow and Havana was a fundamental aspect in the spectacular downturn in their relationship in the years to This situation was something that the Cuban government could not allow to continue and although their rhetoric on the socialist nature of Cuban society may not have changed after a series of reforms were introduced which it was hoped would alleviate these economic problems.

As these appeared to be very different from the socialist economic model, it perfectly illustrated the prevalence of realist pragmatism within the Cuban Revolution as its very survival was at stake. This was to be partly funded by permitting foreign companies to invest in the Cuban tourist industry, which as stated in chapter 2, would be vital to the Cuban government in the s as it attempted to economically recover from the loss of the Soviet Union.

These Cuban attempts were aided by the fact that the end of the Soviet Union and Soviet-Cuban relations had coincided with the increase in the globalisation process, partly as a result of the lack of an alternative to the international capitalist system with the disappearance of the 60 Chapter 3 socialist economic model. In the final years of the twentieth century globalisation was at the centre of a multifaceted scholarly debate, which did not just concentrate on the process in general, but also over a definitive definition of it and whether it is even a new process or not.

Although this is the case and the effects of globalisation on countries even within the same region have not been universal, what can be concluded is that interdependence between various world economies has increased with the pre-eminence of international capitalism, illustrated by the growth of transnational investment. As outlined, in the late s Cuba had made attempts to encourage foreign investment to the island from outwith the socialist bloc, but in the s this process increased dramatically, with various legislation being passed to encourage this.

In the National Assembly changed the constitution so that state property could be transferred to joint ventures with foreign money and in September a new foreign investment law was passed which not only allowed foreign companies to move their entire profits abroad, but also very significantly allowed percent foreign ownership of investments in Cuba. This was truly historic due to the prominence of nationalism in the Cuban Revolution. Then, in free trade zones were created in a further attempt to attract yet more foreign investment. In addition, internal reforms were also implemented which not only legalised both agricultural and artisan markets to try and alleviate food shortages, but also the possession of U.

They may have ideologically disliked globalisation and neoliberal economics and were not slow to attack them or the effects that they had on the Russian economy but they had had to embrace them to a certain extent due to the dire economic situation which the island found itself in during the early to mids that resulted from the loss of their socialist trading partners and the continuing U.

The strategy could be approximately formulated as follows: a policy of alliance with some sectors or factions of the international bourgeoisie as to successfully resist and overcome imperialist harassment and to achieve paths towards development. Moreover, in an attempt to broaden the appeal of the Communist Party of Cuba PCC religious believers were allowed to become members of the party.

Dissidents at home and opponents abroad were not satisfied with the paucity of political change. Though economic change was generally welcomed, some critics found it inadequate. Orthodox cadres in the regime took the opposites tack: they believed that the changes had gone too far and could only jeopardize the socialist system, weakening its true nature.

This has led some to believe that aspects of the revolution have even been eroded, and not just because these reforms embraced neoliberal economics, the very antithesis of earlier Cuban economic models. However, tourism has also caused inequality on 62 Chapter 3 the island to increase as citizens working in this industry have access to foreign currencies and their experiences are very different from those who do not have this luxury.

Moreover, tourism has also resulted in the return of prostitution to the island, which has seen an increase in sexually transmitted diseases amongst Cuban women. Moreover, this process has also spawned the appearance of health tourism which has seen an increasing number of wealthy foreigners being prepared to pay in hard currency for Cuban medical expertise. By mid, joint ventures had come to fruition with over nine different countries from around the world, and in the period from to a further joint enterprises, in conjunction with twenty-eight countries, were created.

In comparison in there were only eleven joint ventures excluding those with socialist bloc countries. European countries have taken an interest in the tourist, tobacco and alcohol industries, with one of the highest profiles being in when the French company Pernod Ricard bought an interest in and the global distribution rights for Havana Club rum. In the similar manner, in the year the French-Spanish company Altadis bought 50 percent of Habanos, the international distributor of Cuban cigars. Ironically, the United States embargo, despite being the antithesis of neoliberal economics, has conversely made Cuba a more appealing investment opportunity for foreign companies, as they do not have to face competition from U.

This has allowed foreign companies to gain a foothold in the Cuban economy before the embargo ends when U. The implosion of the Soviet Union had a catastrophic effect on the Cuban Revolution, not least economically as the island also simultaneously lost its 64 Chapter 3 most important trading partner. The process of encouraging foreign investment in the island, begun in the late s, increased as a number of different reforms were implemented that aimed to take advantage of the increase in transnational investment with the global dominance of the neoliberal economic model.

This was despite their ideological aversion to these ideas, but they were vital to the survival of the revolution and have helped the Cuban economy recover from its acute problems of the early to mids. This would be vital for relations between Moscow and Havana. This occurred because in the early to mids Russian companies came to realise that they had lost out due to the economic changes made in Cuba. And the Chinese dominate the consumer goods market. The Spanish, the British and the Mexicans are investing in Cuba. In addition, in the two-year period from to , joint projects with Cuban and foreign money were opened but only two of these were with Cuban and Russian money.

This was something that Russian companies wished to address and once again become more involved in the Cuban economy to take advantage of the investment op- The Continuing Role of Ideology 65 portunities that it offered. Dr Rodolfo Humpierre of CEE in Havana stated that this was most certainly the case with companies which had experience of trading with Cuba from the Soviet era.

As an increasing number of foreign companies became involved in the Cuban economy Russia witnessed the loss of their pre-eminent position within it. A desire to address this situation was key to the increase in Russian interest in the Cuban economy from the mids onwards. This was only aided by the thirty-year links between the two countries from the Soviet era, which will be examined in the next chapter. However, the upshot has been that a bi-product of these reforms, although not planned but resulting from the effects of neoliberal economics, has been significant in Russian-Cuban relations.

The irony was that ideology, or more specifically the ideas of the free market but most certainly not Marxist-Leninism, remained crucial to relations between Havana and Moscow at the end of the twentieth century. This was aided by the, as stated, economic changes that took place in Russia throughout the s, which saw the country move to a market economy.

Humpierre believes that this process was very significant for the increase in Russian interest in the Cuban economy. In addition, Russian agriculture production fell dramatically in the aftermath of the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the implementation of neoliberal economics which resulted in a drastic 66 Chapter 3 fall in tobacco production which increased the importance of the purchase of this commodity from Cuba.

In relation to this, in May La Casa del Habano, a Cuban cigar emporium very much concentrating on the exclusive end of this market, was opened in Moscow. Directly linked to this was the creation in of the Russian-Cuba Commission on Commercial, Economic, Scientific and Technical Cooperation, which did not just provide a much more robust foundation for trade to be conducted in but also illustrated the growing importance that the Russian Federation attached to trade and commerce with Cuba.

In addition, intergovernment agreements have also been signed, which in included the hope of an increase in Information Technology IT and telecommunication links between the two countries. The fact that this upturn in Russian-Cuban trade was based on an increase in Cuban exports to Russia, very different from Cuban trade with other countries that were primarily based on Cuba importing goods and not exporting them, was equally remarkable.

This led Ricardo Cabrisas, Cuban Foreign Minister, in to even suggest that by or the year trade between Havana and Moscow may even return to the level. This is partly explained by the economic crisis that hit Russia in August , but it most certainly does not mean that Russian interest in the Cuban economy has waned. For example Rosvooruzheniya, the Russian state arms company, never closed its Cuban office while it did in other parts of Latin America. This would become very significant in the twenty-first century as Russian interest in Latin America increased.

Again the increase in trade was despite the Helms-Burton Act that had seen Washington attempt to restrict Cuban trade with third party countries, and moreover, this act had even contained a section that concentrated specifically on Russia due to the listening post at Lourdes that remained open throughout the s. The importance of this will be discussed in both chapters 4 and 5. Moscow not only voted against the implementation of the act in the UN resolution that condemned it but appeared to be prepared to both ignore and circumvent it.

This had occurred due to both the globalisation process in general and the economic changes made in Cuba in the s, which resulted in making the Cuban economy an inviting investment opportunity for transnational capital. Other reasons, such as a number of Cubans having a Russian language ability that made trade negotiations easier, as well as other aspects of the Soviet legacy were also important and these will be analysed in detail in the next chapter.

However, neoliberal economics was one of the key reasons that resulted in the improvement of relations between Moscow and Havana from the mids onwards. Just as in the Soviet era it appeared as if ideology was again significant in the relationship, but ironically it was not MarxistLeninism but instead its very antithesis. Due to the nature of the globalisation process was this Russian interest in the Cuban economy not simply a result of the process in general and not due to the Russian desire to correct the losses it sustained in it in the s? If this was the case it could also be expected that Russian trade with other Latin American countries would have also increased at an equivalent rate.

However, this is not the case as trade between Russia and Cuba far exceeded Russian trade with any other Latin American country in the period from to , with only trade with Brazil even approaching this level. The irony is that one of the key reasons for the improvement in RussianCuban relations has been the effects of neoliberal economics.

This was no means by design, as it had not been the goal of the Castro regime to specifically stimulate Russian interest in the Cuban economy, but was instead a side effect of the reforms that were instigated in Cuba in the early to mids in an attempt to deal with the economic effects of the disintegration of Soviet-Cuban relations. This had again shown the prevalence of realist pragmatism in the Cuban Revolution because ideologically the Cuban regime may not have liked the nature of these reforms but they were fundamental in its economic revival from the mids onwards. As foreign companies invested in Cuba the realisation formed in Russia that their pre-eminent position within the Cuban economy had been lost and their desire to address this was one of the key reasons for the improvement in relations between Moscow and Havana from the mids onwards.

Moreover, this was not helped by the fact that during his trip to the Caribbean island the Russian President visited both the monument to the unknown Soviet soldier and the highly contentious Lourdes listening post on the outskirts of the Cuban capital. Did this mean that Marxist-Leninism would return to prominence in Russian-Cuban relations in the twenty-first century to the detriment of neoliberal economics that had been one of the factors in the improvement of relations from the mids onwards?

The short answer to this question is a resounding no, as the Russian President demonstrated during his trip to Cuba. Putin between 13 and 16 December Moreover an exchange deal for to involving Cuban sugar, rum, medicines and medical equipment being exchanged for Russian oil, machinery and chemicals was also signed. Russian-Cuban Trade — 70 Chapter 3 that Marxist-Leninism has not returned in importance in the relationship, because if it had it could be expected that the trajectory of the graph would have been upward and not downward, as relations would once again have been driven by political and not economic reasons.

However, the downturn in Russian-Cuban trade does not mean that either the Cuban economy has contracted, as overall trade has increased to 9. Russian-Cuban trade may have fallen but interestingly its composition has changed greatly with 70 percent of the trade conducted in made up of Russian imports to Cuba. This was not just a return to the pattern seen from the Soviet era but was also very different from the late s when trade between the countries had been dominated by Cuban exports to Russia.

In addition, Russian-Cuban relations have been affected by other events, which have seen a partial retrenchment in Cuba from the reforms of the s. Amongst other things the U. However, the appearance of an apparent antiU. Economics, however, remain important to Russian interest in both Cuba and Latin America as the sale of military hardware to the region is a crucial aspect of this.

The Venezuelan purchase of , Kalashnikov rifles, fighter planes and helicopters in may have attracted international attention, but in April 18 Russian companies exhibited goods in Rio de Janeiro at the Latin American Aero and Defense LAAD trade fair, the largest and most important such fair in the region. Moreover, in the year total trade between Cuba and Venezuela reached 1.

In , Cuban-Venezuelan trade continued to increase to over 2b pesos. In addition to this, Peking offers the most attractive interest rates on loans to the Cuban government, which tend to be 3 percent per annum over twenty years, which far exceeds what any other country can offer. Venezuela, Spain, Canada, Russia and China are the five principle countries that Cuba traded with in In addition, during the previous year an international trade fair had been held in the Cuban capital, which ten Russian companies had attended.

Russia is one of the 10 biggest trade partners of Cuba. In addition, the presence of the different types of Russian companies at these trade fairs also illustrate that economic ties between Havana and Moscow have diversified. As suggested this includes IT but also projects involving gas and oil fields, which would revolutionise the relationship, are also desired.

A, Transchemexport S. L and Rosoboronexport all attended the international trade fair held in Havana in November Moreover, further agreements on the Cuban purchase of Russian made planes have recently been signed. The introduction of the Air France, KLM and joint service from Aeroflot and Cubana has undoubtedly made travel from Russia to Cuba easier, as is the fact that Russians do not require visas to travel to Cuba.

Moreover, the appearance of more wealthy Russians who can afford vacations in the Caribbean has also helped this increase. In addition, in January Ernesto Senti, acting Minister for Foreign Investments and Economic Cooperation, stated that tourism was an area that it was hoped could be expanded. Russian Tourists Visiting Cuba 74 Chapter 3 Tourism Foreign Relations department, stated that it was hoped that soon , Russian tourists would be visiting the island each year.

However, ideology has remained crucial to the relationship in the period since , as it partly explains both the downturn in the relationship in the years to and also its subsequent improvement from the mids onwards. Marxist-Leninism may have become less important in the relationship during the Gorbachev era, but once it was completely removed after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the relationship suffered a massive political and economic downturn.

Economically, the removal of Marxist-Leninism was also vital to the downturn in the relationship because as Russia embraced the ideas of neoliberal economics its companies were no longer instructed by the Kremlin whom they could trade with for political reasons and instead had the choice of whom they wished to conduct business with. In the early s this was most certainly not Cuba. At this time not only were Russian companies in no position to compete with Western competitors in the Cuban market due to the Russian economic transition, but the new companies that had appeared in Russia simply did not want to trade with Cuba.

Russian exports to Cuba falling at a faster rate than Cuban imports to Russia illustrated this. However, even at this point some trade was still being conducted between the two countries, the reasons for this will be examined in chapter 4, but this was very important in explaining the surprising lack of comment by the Cuban government on events in the former Soviet Union as they did not want to jeopardize this trade.

The Continuing Role of Ideology 75 However, the economic changes instigated by the Castro regime as it tried to recover from the loss of trade with the Soviet Union did not just illustrate both the strong prevalence of realist pragmatism in the Cuban Revolution and attempts to end dependency, but was also of fundamental importance to the upturn in relations between Moscow and Havana. Some accusations of an erosion of the revolution may have appeared as these reforms were based on neoliberal economics, but they helped the Cuban economy partially recover from its severe contraction of the early s.

As Russian companies witnessed this, the realisation began to form that they were missing out on the investment potential that the Cuban economy offered.

A desire to address this was a key driving force in the upturn in relations from the mids onwards as was the fact that they had sufficiently recovered from the economic transition and were in a position to compete with global competitors in the Cuban market. It could be thought that due to the globalisation process in general Russian interest in the Cuban economy would have taken place anyway, but if this had been the case it could be expected that Russian investment in Latin America as a whole would also have occurred.

This has been aided by a diversification in economic links between the two countries. It must, however, be stressed that this was not by design as it had not been the goal of the Cuban government in making these reforms to encourage Russian interest specifically but just much needed investment in general. This Russian interest had been an unforeseen side effect of the economic reforms of the early to mids. Ironically, neoliberal economics, the antithesis of MarxistLeninism, provided a key reason for both the deterioration in relations in the years to and its subsequent improvement.

The result is that ideology remained significant to relations between Havana and Moscow in the post era. Izvestia, 17 September , 5. Granma, 8 September , 3—6. Izvestia, 11 January , 3. Izvestia, 4 May , 5. Nezavisimaya gazeta, 18 August , 4.

Russia Will Help Cuba! Lavrov Rekindles Relations With Old Ally During Friendly Visit to Havana!

Izvestia, 12 March Vneshiaia Torgovliia v —, 5 and Vneshiaia Torgovliia v , and Trade in was , million pesos, , million in and just , million in Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook , However, he states that after external reasons were the causes of the worsening economic situation on the island. Carmelo Mesa-Lago and J. The Continuing Role of Ideology 77 This was also illustrated by the falling calorie consumption of the Cuban population at this time and that in August the island had been experiencing twelve hours a day with no power due to fuel shortages.

Implications for U. Dr Rodolfo Humpierre of Centro de Estudios Europeos CEE in Havana made this point to me about new Russian companies in the early s being prepared to trade with Cuba but only under new terms of trade during an interview conducted in Havana on 14 February in Havana. Lavrov, Latinskaia America, No.

Vorotnikov, former Soviet ambassador to Cuba, has also blamed Yeltsin for the problems which the Cuban Revolution was experiencing at this time, which is not surprising due to his close association with it from the Soviet era. Sytina, , For this type of reporting see for example Granma, 2 January , 4 and Granma, 3 January , 4. Laguera in Bohemia wrote about the economic struggle that most Russians faced and that state pensions were simply not enough to survive on due to the spiralling prices. De Gorbachov a Yeltsin.

Correra Rusia la misma suerte que le Union Sovietica? Havana: Editorial de Ciencias Sociales 78— A number of articles appeared in Bohemia throughout the s written by Eleana Claro which were highly critical of the situation in Russia. Humpierre made this comment about Kozyrev during an interview conducted in Havana on 14 February in Havana.

Princeton: Princeton University Press, Gwayne, and C. Kay, Latin America Transformed. Robertson, The Three Waves of Globalisation. A History of Developing Global Conscousiness. Nova Scotia: Zed Books, Robert C. The Continuing Role of Ideology 79 The Cuban reforms have been compared to a wide variety of other countries.

Bell Lara, Globalization and the Cuban Revolution, , Azicri, Cuba Today and Tomorrow, Diaz-Briquets and J. Archibald R. Ritter Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, London: Pluto Press, Yorgeny Primadov. Primakov, Minnae pole politiki, Moscow: Molodaia gvardii, , Vorotnikov, Gavana-Moskva, — Larin, Latinskaia Amerika istorii. Moscow: Nauka, Moreover, the title of this article is also significant as it illustrates the feelings that some people within Russia had about the loss of their pre-eminent position within the Cuban economy, as companies from other countries invested in the island.

Dr Rodolfo Humpierre stated this during an interview conducted in Havana on 14 February in Havana. Humpierre, interview conducted on 14 February in Havana. For the dramatic fall in Russian tobacco production see I. Glasov, G.

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KaraMurza and A. Batchikov, El Libro Blanco. Izvestia, 19 May Professor Eugenio Larin stressed the particular importance of both sugar and the creation of the Russian-Cuba Commission on Commercial, Economic, Scientific and Technical Cooperation for Russian-Cuban relations during an interview held in Moscow on 9 January Cuba may have been exporting more goods to Russia than it was importing but it did still import goods, and particularly machinery.

Inzhenernaya Gazeta, No. Moscow Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 26 September , 5. Mesa-Lago and J. Granma International, 17 April , Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook Granma, 13 December , 1. Moscow: Visshaya shkola, , Granma, 29 April , 1. The Continuing Role of Ideology 81 Interfax Interview with Alexander Yakovenko 16 November Moscow Prensa Latina, 17 December As stated, Chinese loans have been more attractive than Russian ones due to lower interest rates.

The Chinese offer is for twenty years at 3 percent per annum whereas the Russian one is for ten years at 5 percent per annum. Caribbean Update, 15 11 7 December On the Cubatravel homepage there are only four language options, Spanish, English, German and Russian. The difficult Week conducted in this box is donated on the latest Programs of detailed ripple and the municipal calcium of Ayurveda, an counterintuitive Author of personal ability.

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Russian-Cuban Relations since 1992

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Russian-Cuban Relations since 1992: Continuing Camaraderie in a Post-Soviet World Russian-Cuban Relations since 1992: Continuing Camaraderie in a Post-Soviet World
Russian-Cuban Relations since 1992: Continuing Camaraderie in a Post-Soviet World Russian-Cuban Relations since 1992: Continuing Camaraderie in a Post-Soviet World
Russian-Cuban Relations since 1992: Continuing Camaraderie in a Post-Soviet World Russian-Cuban Relations since 1992: Continuing Camaraderie in a Post-Soviet World
Russian-Cuban Relations since 1992: Continuing Camaraderie in a Post-Soviet World Russian-Cuban Relations since 1992: Continuing Camaraderie in a Post-Soviet World
Russian-Cuban Relations since 1992: Continuing Camaraderie in a Post-Soviet World Russian-Cuban Relations since 1992: Continuing Camaraderie in a Post-Soviet World
Russian-Cuban Relations since 1992: Continuing Camaraderie in a Post-Soviet World Russian-Cuban Relations since 1992: Continuing Camaraderie in a Post-Soviet World
Russian-Cuban Relations since 1992: Continuing Camaraderie in a Post-Soviet World Russian-Cuban Relations since 1992: Continuing Camaraderie in a Post-Soviet World

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